

Cesky Telecom

06 October 2004

Telecommunications services

Czech Republic

Current price CZK 327

Buy

Target price CZK 402

Recommendation upgrade

Source: PSE



| FY/e 31.12 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Sales (CZK m) | 52,856 | 51,476 | 61,966 | 61,579 |
| EBITDA (CZK m) | 26,150 | 23,814 | 28,351 | 27,931 |
| Pre-Tax (CZK m) | 6,110 | -6,667 | 6,789 | 6,526 |
| Adj. EPS* (CZK) | 13.3 | -5.4 | 16.2 | 15.0 |
| EPS (CZK) | 13.3 | neg | 14.0 | 12.8 |
| DPS (CZK) | 57.4 | 17.0 | 29.2 | 44.0 |
| P/E* (x) | 24.6 | neg | 23.3 | 25.5 |
| Yield (%) | 17.6% | 5.2% | 8.9% | 13.5% |
| EV/EBITDA (x) | 5.0 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 4.7 |

Source: Patria Finance, Cesky Telecom

*Adjusted for goodwill amortization

Reuters SPTTsp.PR

Bloomberg SPTT CP

www.ct.cz

Market Cap EUR 3.3bn

Shares outst. 322m

Volume (daily) EUR 13.5m

Free Float 49%

Next Corporate Event

Consolidated Q3 2004 IFRS results

| Performance over | 1m | 3m | 12m |
|------------------|---------------|-----|------|
| Absolute | -3% | +2% | +16% |
| Rel. Index | -8% | -7% | -25% |
| Rel. Sector | | | |
| 12-m Hi/Lo | CZK 360 / 244 | | |
| EUR / CZK | 31.4 | | |

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Cesky Telecom is the dominant wire-line operator in the Czech Republic. It has significant exposure to the wireless market via its 100%-owned subsidiary Eurotel, the No. 1 domestic mobile operator.

Based on our revised projections we have increased our target price to CZK402 from CZK330. The higher fair value reflects CT's focus on stabilization of fixed line revenues and the positive impact of the full consolidation of Eurotel. The transformation program is focused on cutting operating costs and has led to one of the highest EBITDA margins among CT's peers. Falling OPEX, limited CAPEX, stable leverage and no immediate acquisition plans open the door to dividend payments over and above what would be allowed under the approved dividend policy.

- We regard the current discount to our fair value as a result of privatization form uncertainty. Based on recent information, we believe that the odds are moving towards the capital markets option.
- In the case of a tender, the state's stake would probably be sold at a price close to our fair value, i.e. CZK402 (based of FCFE suitable for minority investors). We see a significant majority premium as unlikely. We believe that CT's shares would react positively to the announcement of a tender sale and move towards our expected minimal buy-out price of CZK382.
- In a capital markets transaction, we believe that the discount to the current market price should not exceed 10%. While a risk of profit taking in the short term exists, we expect CT's shares to move towards their fair value in the mid-term given the company's strong fundamentals and relative undervaluation compared to peers.
- Based on our analysis of the two possible privatization methods, the increasing likelihood of a capital markets transaction, the fair value of the company together with a relative comparison of CT's shares with its European peers, an investment in the stock offers an upside potential of at least 17%, thereby justifying our buy recommendation.

Summary

Based on our revised projections we have increased our target price to CZK402 from CZK330 per share (note that we have also switched to a free-cash-flow-to-equity based valuation, which is suitable for investors without a control over company's cash flows, from a free cash flow model). The higher fair value estimate reflects CT's increasing focus on the stabilization of fixed line revenues and the positive impact of the full consolidation of CT's mobile subsidiary Eurotel. The recently launched transformation program is focused on reducing operating costs and has so far led to the maintenance of strong operating efficiency reflected in one of the highest, EBITDA margin among CT's regional and European peers. Falling OPEX, limited CAPEX, stable leverage with favourable debt condition and no immediate acquisition plans are leading to dividend payments possibly well in excess of what would be warranted by the approved dividend policy.

The current discount to our fair value is mainly a result of uncertainty regarding the privatisation method for the state's 51% stake in CT. The Cabinet is currently considering three possible methods: (i) a sale to the winner of the tender, (ii) a sale through capital markets and (iii) a combination of the two. We believe that the decision may be known by the end of November. Recent comments from the PM and deputy PM favour a capital markets transaction. In addition, the state budget for 2005 assumes CZK 58 bn in proceeds from privatization of CT and Severoceske doly. All in all we believe that the odds are currently moving towards the capital markets option.

Should the Cabinet decide on a tender sale, we believe the 51% stake would be sold at a price close to our fair value of CZK 402 (based on FCFE suitable for minority shareholders). We assume that the potential majority premium would be limited by the requirement of a mandatory buy-out offer to minority investors, which should offset any tax-shield implied by likely debt-financing of the transaction. We believe that CT's shares would react positively to the announcement of a tender-based sale and should move towards CZK382, which should be the minimum buy-out price (based on a 6M weighted average). Further upside for the share would depend on the strategic plans of the new owner (i.e. restructuring, increasing leverage, divestures, further additional buy-outs etc.), whose impact we are currently unable to determine.


Should the state's stake be sold through capital markets, we believe that the discount to current market prices would not exceed 10% given recent placements of telecom shares on the European markets suggesting a positive investor sentiment towards the sector. Also, at a 10% discount to the market value, CT's shares would be valued lower compared than its peers, which should create strong demand for the offering. While a risk of profit taking in the short term exists, we think a move towards the fair value as very likely for the share in the mid-term given the company's strong fundamentals and relative undervaluation compared with its European peers.

Based on our analysis of the two privatization methods, the increasing likelihood of a capital markets transaction, the fair value of the company together with the relative comparison of CT's shares with its European peers, an investment in the stock offers an upside potential of at least 17%, thereby justifying our BUY recommendation.

Fundamentals

Consolidated sales helped by full consolidation of Eurotel.....


Full consolidation of CT's mobile subsidiary, Eurotel, and its better-than-expected performance, helped to push consolidated sales up by nearly 23% y-o-y in 1H04. We expect the full inclusion of Eurotel to gradually offset the negative trend of falling fixed line revenues, in particular fixed line call revenues in the short and mid-term. Eurotel's share on total revenues should increase to 49% by 2010 from the current 44% (1H2004).



Source: Patria Finance, Cesky Telecom

.....and beginning of stabilization of fixed line revenues

We project a stabilization of fixed line revenues in 2006/2007 as (i) by then data revenues will match voice revenues due to a strong focus on data, internet and the value added services (VAS) segment and (ii) the rate of decrease in call revenues should flatten given stabilization of customers' outflow due to nearly 100% mobile penetration, stabilization of migration to alternative fixed line operators and offers of more competitive call packages. In the long-term, we expect data revenues to form over 50% of total fixed line revenues.




Source: Patria Finance, Cesky Telecom

Highest operating efficiency among European peers

The transformation plan launched at end-2003 focuses on the reduction of all categories of controllable operating costs. Fixed line operating costs declined by 6.5% y-o-y in 1H04. Staff costs, which form 34% of total fixed line operating costs, fell by 5.1% y-o-y due to staff reductions of 26% y-o-y. As a result, the number of fixed lines per employee now stands at 368 compared with 282 in 1H03. Despite Eurotel's 8.9% rise in operating costs y-o-y in 1H04 (due mainly to high equipment and material costs of sales) the company managed to achieve an EBITDA margin of 48.7%. As a result, the consolidated EBITDA margin reached 48.7%, well above CT's regional peers - Matav (42.3%) and TPSA (43.5%) as well as its EU peers (in 1H04).

Depreciation

Consolidated depreciation charges increased by 13.2% y-o-y, as a result of the full consolidation of Eurotel, while the Depreciation/Sales ratio declined from 36.3% to 33.5% in 1H04 compared with 1H03. This was largely caused by the impairment of part of the fixed line network totalling CZK 9.9bn and booked in 2003. Declining CAPEX also played a role. The impact of the impairment on depreciation should be offset by a new accounting law (coming into force from January 2005). Under the new law, we assume the depreciation period will be reduced, which would increase CT's annual depreciation charges. This together with huge investments in the fixed line network between 1995 and 2002 worth over CZK130bn should lead to higher depreciation charges compared with CAPEX (CAPEX needs are on the decline). For 2010, we project the Depreciation/Sales ratio to stand at 22% compared with the current level of 34%. On the other hand CAPEX/Depreciation should increase to 68% in 2010 from a projected 34% in 2004. Nevertheless, CAPEX would still be below depreciation, which suggests over-investment in the past and may lead to another impairment charge in the future.



Source: Patria Finance, Cesky Telecom

Lower taxes should hold the bottom line

Corporate income tax (CIT) is expected to decline from the current level of 28% to 26% in 2005 and finally to 24% in 2006. The declining CIT should be reflected in effective CIT, positively impacting CT's net income and hence cash flows.

Sound capital structure

Consolidated debt reached CZK31.2bn at end-June 2004, representing a 31% decrease against the 2003 level. The debt/equity ratio stands at 0.35 which is less than that of Matak (0.56) and TPSA (1.11). Net debt/equity now equals 0.34. Given favourable conditions on Eurotel's acquisition debt (CT does not expect the margin to exceed 0.5% of up to 6M EURIBOR/PRIBOR), CT is in no hurry to speed up debt repayments ahead of schedule. We set CT's target D/E ratio at 0.3.

Payout should exceed set dividend policy

CT's AGM in June 2003 approved a dividend payout of between 50% and 70% of consolidated net income. However, given: (i) CT's focus on reducing operating expenses leading to strong operating cash flows, (ii) limited CAPEX, which should not exceed 12% of sales in the next coming years (including CAPEX into 3G), (iii) a stable capital structure and favourable debt conditions and (iv) no immediate acquisitions, we believe that CT would be able to pay dividends in excess of the approved dividend policy.

| Dividends | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Dividends per share CZK | 17.0 | 29.2 | 44.0 | 40.9 | 38.9 | 38.1 | 39.9 |
| Dividend yield | 5.2% | 8.9% | 13.5% | 12.5% | 11.9% | 11.6% | 12.2% |

Dividend yield is calculated using a price CZK327 per share

Valuation

Based on our new projections we increase CT's fair value from CZK330 to CZK402. The fair value is derived from two-stage free cash flow to equity model (FCFE). FCFE considers cash flows taken after the company meets all its financial obligations, capital expenditures and working capital needs. We have used the FCFE method as it is suitable for investors who do not have a majority control over a company's cash flows.

The first stage of the model reflects detailed projections of financial statements in the period covering 2004 to 2010. FCFE of individual years is calculated as a sum of net cash flows plus dividends paid and are discounted to present value by a discount rate. The discount rate equals the required rate of return on equity, which is defined as a risk free rate plus an equity premium.

The second stage is formed by a terminal value estimate, which is CT's value after 2010 assuming stable growth. The terminal value is derived from a long-term growth rate model, which includes a growth rate after the terminal year to infinity. The long-term FCFE growth rate is calculated as a function of RoIC plus a plowback ratio.

| | | | |
|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| Risk-free rate | 5.1% | Target D/E | 0.30 |
| Market risk premium | 6.0% | Long-term RoIC | 10.6% |
| Beta levered | 1.0 | LT dividend pay-out | 80% |
| CAPM cost of equity | 11.3% | LT cash flow growth | 2.1% |

| Sensitivity analysis | | Required rate of return | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------|-------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | 9.32% | 10.32% | 11.32% | 12.32% | 13.32% | 14.32% | 15.32% |
| In CZK | | | | | | | | |
| | 0.36% | 435 | 392 | 356 | 327 | 302 | 280 | 261 |
| | 1.36% | 469 | 418 | 377 | 343 | 315 | 291 | 270 |
| LT CF Growth rate | 2.36% | 512 | 450 | 402 | 362 | 330 | 303 | 281 |
| | 3.36% | 570 | 492 | 433 | 386 | 349 | 318 | 293 |
| | 4.36% | 649 | 546 | 472 | 416 | 372 | 336 | 307 |

Higher valuation compared with regional peers justified

At current prices, the company would be valued roughly in line with its regional peers, i.e. TPSA (Poland) and Matav (Hungary). Using the fair value price, the valuation would come in above its peers; nevertheless, we believe that the higher valuation is justified by CT's sounder balance sheet with a lower D/E ratio in relative terms and strong operating margins.

| Ratios | EV/EBITDA | P/S | P/E | P/OCF | Dividend yield | 2005 | D/E | EBITDA margin | P/BV |
|--------|-----------|------|-------|-------|----------------|-------|------|---------------|------|
| CT1 | 4.59 | 1.70 | 23.28 | 3.77 | 9.0% | 13.8% | 0.35 | 45.8% | 1.18 |
| CT2 | 5.49 | 2.11 | 28.90 | 4.69 | 4.2% | 7.2% | 0.30 | 45.8% | 1.47 |
| Matav | 4.72 | 1.41 | 16.93 | 7.64 | 9.9% | 9.1% | 0.50 | 41.2% | 1.53 |
| TPSA | 4.03 | 1.15 | 12.44 | 4.47 | 3.4% | 3.1% | 1.10 | 44.8% | 1.38 |

1 at current market price; 2 at fair value

But still offering a discount to European peers However compared with European peers, CT's shares would be still trading at a discount. The discount has been always present right across the CEE market but we expect the valuation gap to close as the regions' economic growth outstrips that of other EU countries and we see a possible decrease in the regional risk premium.

| Ratios | EV/EBITDA | P/S | P/E | P/OCF | dividend yield | D/E | EBITDA margin | P/BV | Ratios |
|-----------|-----------|------|-------|-------|----------------|------|---------------|------|-----------|
| CT1 | 4.59 | 1.70 | 23.28 | 3.77 | 9.0% | 0.35 | 45.8% | 1.18 | CT1 |
| CT2 | 5.49 | 2.11 | 28.90 | 4.69 | 4.2% | 0.30 | 0.3 | 1.47 | CT2 |
| EU peers* | 5.70 | 1.28 | 19.67 | 6.23 | | 0.95 | 31.1% | 2.42 | EU peers* |

1 at current market price; 2 at fair value

* Deutsche Telekom, Cable&Wireless, France Telecom, Hellenic Telecom, Portugal Telecom, KPN, Swisscom, TDC, Telecom Italia, Tele2, Telefonica, Telekom Austria, TeliaSonera, British Telecom.

Privatisation uncertainty is behind the discount We believe that the current discount to the market value of CT's shares compared with our fundamental value of the company is mainly a result of uncertainty regarding the privatisation of the state's 51% stake in the company.

The Government's plan to privatise the company had been put on hold due to a recent political crisis. The crisis was solved relatively quickly and the privatisation process is now back on track. According to the National Property Fund's (NPF) deputy chairman, Pavel Kuta, the recommendation for the optimal privatization form to be submitted to the Cabinet by the NPF and CSFB/CS, is not ready yet and the Cabinet might receive it in the first half of November. Originally, the Cabinet was expected to make a decision on the privatization form by the end of October. We believe now that the decision may be known by the end of November.

Current situation differs to last attempt to privatise CT Current internal and external factors affecting the privatisation have changed significantly compared with the previous government's attempt to privatise the company back in 2002.

- (i) financial position of telecommunication companies has significantly improved as telecommunication operators successfully reduced debt levels, sold non-core assets and restructured operations,
- (ii) Telecommunication operators resumed and/or increased their dividend payments, initiated share-buy back programs and began considering acquisitions, as organic growth opportunities in their local markets became scarce,
- (iii) CT bought the remaining 49% stake in Eurotel and improved its balance sheet,
- (iv) The departure of TelSource, KPN and Atlantic West left a more transparent ownership structure and eliminated the risk that their presence would create hurdles for the possible privatization,
- (v) The company initiated an ambitious transformation program aimed at increasing operating efficiency and improving the services portfolio.

Privatization methods The Government is currently considering three possible solutions to selling its 51% stake in CT. These include: (i) a tender, (ii) a sale through capital markets and (iii) a combination of the two. We will discuss the first two forms in greater detail later, but we consider the third option as highly unlikely.

Where do the Government's preferences lie?

There have been conflicting comments from government officials regarding the preferred sale method. The IT ministry seems to support a tender while the PM and deputy PM in charge of economic affairs have expressed their preference for a capital market transaction. In addition, the state budget for 2005 assumes CZK58bn in proceeds from the privatization of CT and Severoceske doly. All in all we believe that the odds are moving towards the capital markets option.

Are there any potential bidders?

While we see it as highly unlikely that a single strategic investor (telco operator) would buy CT, several consortiums including telco operators have been mentioned as potential bidders. These include CVC Capital Partners/Swisscom, TDC/Goldman Sachs, Apax and PPF. Also Vodafone hired Citigroup to advise it on the opportunity. Deutsche Telekom has also been mentioned as a potential bidder. Nevertheless, we see this as unlikely given DT's repeated announcements that it is not interested in the privatization its focus on mobile operators and its 61% stake in T-Mobile CR.

Minimum price should be CZK341 per share

The Government hopes to receive a majority premium for the 51% stake should it be sold to a tender winner. We believe that the potential majority premium is limited by the requirement of a mandatory buy-out offer to minority investors, which should offset the tax-shield implied by the probable debt-financed nature of the transaction. We therefore assume that the stake would be sold at a price close to our fundamental value of CZK402 per share (note that the fundamental value is based on FCFE, which is suitable for minority investors). We see the bottom limit at CZK341 per share, which is the price offered by Deutsche Bank/TDC back in 2002, when CT itself and the whole telecommunication industry was in a very different shape.

Buy-out offer conditions

The new owner would have to offer a buy-out to minority shareholders once the transaction is completed. The price would be set on the basis of (i) 85% of the transaction price, (ii) the weighted average price over the last six months including the acquisition transaction and (iii) an independent expert valuation. Based on our fair value estimate and the assumed acquisition price of CZK402 per share the 85% would be CZK342. The 6-month average assuming a constant price of 327 and daily trading volume of US\$11m until the close of the transaction would be CZK382. Therefore, based on the buy-out requirement, the buy-out should be at least at CZK382 per share.

| Market price | 327 | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| | market price | 5% premium | 10% premium | 15% premium |
| Acquisition @ | | | | |
| Acquisition price | 327 | 343 | 359 | 376 |
| Buy-out @ 85% of acquisition price | 278 | 292 | 306 | 319 |
| NPV @ rrr of 11.3% | 255 | 268 | 280 | 292 |
| Buy-out @ 6M weighted average | 327 | 339 | 351 | 363 |
| NPV @ rrr of 11.3% | 286 | 297 | 307 | 318 |

Positive reaction to tender announcement expected

We believe the stock would react positively to an announcement of a tender-based sale and would move towards the lower buy-out limit, which should, according to the regulations governing buy-outs, be at CZK382 per share. Further rises in the share would be influenced by strategic plans of the new owner (i.e. restructuring, divestures, increasing leverage, further additional buy-outs etc), which we are currently unable to determine. Nevertheless, there are some risks associated with it. These include:

- (i) Uncertainty regarding the buy-out price,
- (ii) Cash from the buy-out may be received at the beginning of 2006 at the earliest, thereby reducing the NPV of the proceeds,
- (iii) uncertainty regarding a possible sale of Eurotel, which may end up echoing the case of Ceske radio and its stake in T-Mobile CR,
- (iv) Under investment of CT and intentional depression of CT's shares to warrant lower eventual further buy-out,
- (v) Use of all CT's free cash flow for debt repayment,
- (vi) Reduced free float and trading volume,
- (vii) De-listing of CT's shares

Sale through capital markets

CT's shares have reacted negatively to recent comments by the PM and deputy PM favouring a sale of the state's stake through capital markets because investors fear a share overhang may depress CT's share price. However, we do not view the possibility of a capital market transaction as a disaster. On the contrary, in fact. Although a capital markets transaction would inevitably lead to a share drop, judging from recent similar capital markets transaction, we would be surprised if the discount exceeded 10% of the market value. In addition, we believe the potential demand for CT's share would be strong, eliminating the risk of a share overhang, based on (i) the current undervaluation of CT's shares indicated by our estimated fair value and that of European peers, and (ii) over subscription of TelSource's 27% stake in CT back in 2003, and (iii) sale of government's stake in France Telecom worth € 4.5 bn (double the value of the 51% stake in CT). While there may be some risk of short-term profit taking on future appreciation of CT's shares, we see them moving steadily towards our fair value of CZK402 in the mid-term. In addition, a potentially strong free float and hence trading volume should also play a positive role.

| Recent capital markets transactions | | Discount to | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|------------------|
| Company | Transaction value | 6M average | Last close | Transaction date |
| France Telecom | EUR 4,500 mn | 5.5% | 2.0% | 01/09/2004 |
| TPSA | EUR 97 mn | -0.1% | 1.0% | 02/04/2004 |
| TDC | EUR 1,301 mn | 17.1% | 9.2% | 10/06/2004 |
| Telenor | EUR 996 mn | 3.2% | 2.8% | 30/03/2004 |
| Telekom Austria | EUR 780 mn | -10.2% | 0.2% | 22/01/2004 |

negative sign implies a premium

In the case of a capital market transaction, the final size of the discount would also depend on the timing of the transaction, i.e. the time lag between the Government's decision to float the stake (from the date of the public announcement) and the opening of the books is crucial. The bigger the time lag the larger the discount.

| Sale @ discount to the current market price | 0% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 10% | 15% |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Price | 327 | 310 | 307 | 304 | 294 | 278 |

Risks associated with capital market transaction:

- (viii) demand in the offering may not be sufficient and the whole stake may not be sold,
- (ix) share overhang may be created,
- (x) profit-taking may eliminate CT's shares future appreciation,
- (xi) there may be a time lag between decision for capital markets transaction and the actual transaction significantly depressing CT's shares price,
- (xii) a 'consortium' of investors may buy significant stakes in the offering, which would allow it to virtually control CT, however no buy-out would be triggered as they would not officially act in concert.

Whatever happens, CT is a BUY

Based on our analysis of the two possible privatization methods, the increasing likelihood of a capital market transaction, the fair value of the company together with a relative comparison of CT's shares with its European peers, an investment in the stock offers upside potential of at least 17%, a level which clearly justifies our BUY recommendation.

Financial data

| INCOME STATEMENT (CZK m) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E | 2006E | 2007E | 2008E | 2009E | 2010E |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total revenues | 55,900 | 52,856 | 51,476 | 61,966 | 61,579 | 62,373 | 63,336 | 64,417 | 65,216 | 66,045 |
| Operating costs | 28,745 | 26,706 | 27,662 | 33,615 | 33,648 | 34,191 | 35,448 | 36,949 | 38,398 | 39,641 |
| EBITDA | 27,155 | 26,150 | 23,814 | 28,351 | 27,931 | 28,182 | 27,888 | 27,468 | 26,818 | 26,404 |
| Depreciation | 17,040 | 19,062 | 19,444 | 21,077 | 20,025 | 18,284 | 17,230 | 16,261 | 15,189 | 14,677 |
| EBIT | 10,115 | 7,088 | -5,539 | 7,274 | 7,907 | 9,898 | 10,658 | 11,207 | 11,629 | 11,727 |
| Net financial profit | 1,711 | 1,208 | 741 | 1,081 | 1,381 | 992 | 848 | 678 | 536 | 458 |
| Goodwill amortization | 0 | 0 | 53 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 |
| Pretax | 8,771 | 6,110 | -6,667 | 6,789 | 6,526 | 8,906 | 9,810 | 10,529 | 11,094 | 11,269 |
| Income tax | 2,699 | 1,885 | 0 | 1,560 | 1,697 | 2,137 | 2,354 | 2,527 | 2,662 | 2,705 |
| Net income | 6,072 | 4,276 | -1,780 | 4,521 | 4,121 | 6,061 | 6,747 | 7,294 | 7,723 | 7,857 |
| EPS (CZK) | 18.85 | 13.28 | -5.53 | 14.04 | 12.79 | 18.82 | 20.95 | 22.65 | 23.98 | 24.39 |
| Adjusted EPS (CZK) | 0.00 | 13.28 | -5.36 | 16.23 | 14.99 | 21.01 | 23.15 | 24.84 | 26.18 | 26.59 |
| DPS (CZK) | 0.00 | 57.44 | 17.00 | 29.24 | 44.03 | 40.95 | 38.89 | 38.05 | 39.88 | 0.00 |
| Total revenues | 55,900 | 52,856 | 51,476 | 61,966 | 61,579 | 62,373 | 63,336 | 64,417 | 65,216 | 66,045 |

Revenue Structure

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Total revenues | 55,900 | 52,856 | 51,476 | 61,966 | 61,579 | 62,373 | 63,336 | 64,417 | 65,216 | 66,045 |
| Fixed line total revenues | 41,881 | 38,995 | 36,507 | 34,044 | 33,048 | 33,048 | 33,172 | 33,469 | 33,722 | 34,007 |
| Call revenues | 21,150 | 13,664 | 10,098 | 7,202 | 5,840 | 5,348 | 4,912 | 4,525 | 4,270 | 4,032 |
| Connection, subscription | 7,523 | 10,793 | 10,667 | 10,180 | 9,869 | 9,655 | 9,721 | 9,864 | 9,980 | 10,093 |
| Interconnection | 3,910 | 2,593 | 3,137 | 3,429 | 3,504 | 3,583 | 3,487 | 3,394 | 3,330 | 3,266 |
| Data and internet | 7,717 | 9,995 | 11,099 | 11,649 | 12,392 | 13,135 | 13,791 | 14,425 | 14,869 | 15,330 |
| Other | 1,581 | 1,951 | 1,506 | 1,585 | 1,443 | 1,327 | 1,261 | 1,261 | 1,273 | 1,286 |
| Mobile total revenues | 30,063 | 28,800 | 29,078 | 29,877 | 30,528 | 31,378 | 32,276 | 33,115 | 33,699 | 34,281 |
| Recurring revenues | 17,502 | 18,027 | 27,610 | 27,771 | 28,734 | 29,595 | 30,504 | 31,355 | 31,907 | 32,497 |
| Non recurring revenues | 3,500 | 1,931 | 1,468 | 2,106 | 1,794 | 1,783 | 1,772 | 1,760 | 1,792 | 1,785 |

| BALANCE SHEET (CZK m) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E | 2006E | 2007E | 2008E | 2009E | 2010E |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Current Assets | 18,275 | 23,880 | 15,107 | 17,129 | 19,432 | 19,729 | 20,234 | 20,819 | 21,347 | 21,830 |
| Inventories | 1,925 | 1,409 | 1,100 | 1,133 | 1,167 | 1,202 | 1,238 | 1,275 | 1,313 | 1,353 |
| Receivables | 8,857 | 8,435 | 9,081 | 9,915 | 9,853 | 9,980 | 10,134 | 10,307 | 10,435 | 10,567 |
| Cash and Equivalents | 7,493 | 14,036 | 4,926 | 6,082 | 8,412 | 8,548 | 8,862 | 9,237 | 9,599 | 9,910 |
| Fixed Assets | 140,822 | 131,520 | 139,599 | 125,064 | 111,731 | 100,939 | 92,601 | 85,431 | 79,435 | 73,949 |
| Goodwill | 0 | 0 | 14,028 | 13,320 | 12,612 | 11,904 | 11,196 | 10,488 | 9,780 | 9,072 |
| Total Assets | 159,097 | 155,399 | 154,706 | 142,193 | 131,163 | 120,668 | 112,834 | 106,250 | 100,782 | 95,779 |
| Liabilities | 52,035 | 44,039 | 64,549 | 52,991 | 47,258 | 44,884 | 43,492 | 42,140 | 41,205 | 41,190 |
| Loans | 27,003 | 22,830 | 45,065 | 31,065 | 25,065 | 22,265 | 20,265 | 18,265 | 16,765 | 16,265 |
| Other Liabilities | 25,032 | 21,209 | 19,484 | 21,926 | 22,193 | 22,619 | 23,227 | 23,875 | 24,440 | 24,925 |
| Shareholders' Equity | 107,023 | 111,264 | 90,148 | 89,193 | 83,895 | 75,776 | 69,334 | 64,101 | 59,568 | 54,580 |
| Share Capital | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 | 32,209 |
| Reserves | 74,814 | 79,055 | 57,939 | 56,984 | 51,686 | 43,567 | 37,125 | 31,892 | 27,359 | 22,371 |
| Sh. Equity & Liabilities | 159,097 | 155,399 | 154,706 | 142,193 | 131,163 | 120,668 | 112,834 | 106,250 | 100,782 | 95,779 |

| CASH FLOW STATEMENT (CZK m) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E | 2006E | 2007E | 2008E | 2009E | 2010E |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Cash flow from operating activities | 25,186 | 20,454 | 15,654 | 27,882 | 25,149 | 25,316 | 25,104 | 24,702 | 24,019 | 23,555 |
| Investments | -15,790 | -10,447 | -34,748 | -7,250 | -7,400 | -8,200 | -9,600 | -9,800 | -9,900 | -9,900 |
| Financing | -8,523 | -3,750 | 4,279 | -19,476 | -15,418 | -16,981 | -15,189 | -14,527 | -13,756 | -13,344 |
| Sales growth | -2.3% | -5.4% | -2.6% | 20.4% | -0.6% | 1.3% | 1.5% | 1.7% | 1.2% | 1.3% |
| EBITDA margin | 48.6% | 49.5% | 46.3% | 45.8% | 45.4% | 45.2% | 44.0% | 42.6% | 41.1% | 40.0% |
| ROA | 3.8% | 2.8% | -1.2% | 3.2% | 3.1% | 5.0% | 6.0% | 6.9% | 7.7% | 8.2% |
| ROE | 5.8% | 3.9% | -1.8% | 5.0% | 4.8% | 7.6% | 9.3% | 10.9% | 12.5% | 13.8% |
| Debt/Equity | 25.2% | 20.5% | 50.0% | 34.8% | 29.9% | 29.4% | 29.2% | 28.5% | 28.1% | 29.8% |
| Net debt/Equity | 18.2% | 7.9% | 44.5% | 28.0% | 19.8% | 18.1% | 16.4% | 14.1% | 12.0% | 11.6% |
| CAPEX/Sales | 32.1% | 21.0% | 13.6% | 11.7% | 12.0% | 13.1% | 15.2% | 15.2% | 15.2% | 15.0% |
| Depreciation/Sales | 30.5% | 36.1% | 37.8% | 34.0% | 32.5% | 29.3% | 27.2% | 25.2% | 23.3% | 22.2% |

Source: Patria Finance, Cesky Telecom

| Eurotel | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| INCOME STATEMENT (CZK m) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E | 2006E | 2007E | 2008E | 2009E | 2010E |
| Total revenues | 30,063 | 28,800 | 29,078 | 29,877 | 30,528 | 31,378 | 32,276 | 33,115 | 33,699 | 34,281 |
| Total costs | 16,813 | 15,106 | 14,879 | 15,941 | 16,325 | 17,281 | 18,338 | 19,425 | 20,464 | 21,227 |
| EBITDA | 13,250 | 13,694 | 14,199 | 13,936 | 14,204 | 14,097 | 13,938 | 13,690 | 13,235 | 13,054 |
| Depreciation | 4,194 | 4,684 | 5,008 | 5,358 | 5,199 | 5,165 | 5,265 | 5,385 | 5,507 | 5,730 |
| EBIT | 9,056 | 9,116 | 9,191 | 8,578 | 9,005 | 8,932 | 8,673 | 8,305 | 7,729 | 7,324 |
| Net financial profit | 281 | 57 | -103 | 24 | -110 | -117 | -126 | -123 | -123 | -131 |
| Pre tax expense | 8,775 | 9,059 | 9,294 | 8,553 | 9,115 | 9,050 | 8,799 | 8,428 | 7,851 | 7,455 |
| Income tax | 2,707 | 2,732 | 2,040 | 2,395 | 2,370 | 2,172 | 2,112 | 2,023 | 1,884 | 1,789 |
| Net income | 6,068 | 6,271 | 7,254 | 6,315 | 6,902 | 6,878 | 6,687 | 6,405 | 5,967 | 5,666 |

Revenue Structure

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Recurring revenues | 17,502 | 18,027 | 27,610 | 27,771 | 28,734 | 29,595 | 30,504 | 31,355 | 31,907 | 32,497 |
| Monthly fees | 5,049 | 4,994 | 4,823 | 5,473 | 6,115 | 6,536 | 6,890 | 7,168 | 7,408 | 7,610 |
| Call revenues | 12,453 | 13,033 | 12,778 | 11,799 | 11,482 | 11,359 | 11,298 | 11,250 | 11,290 | 11,312 |
| Interconnection revenues | 7,011 | 5,836 | 6,705 | 6,636 | 6,545 | 6,588 | 6,666 | 6,750 | 6,774 | 6,787 |
| SMS, MMS, data, internet, VAS | 2,332 | 3,006 | 3,311 | 3,863 | 4,593 | 5,112 | 5,649 | 6,187 | 6,435 | 6,787 |
| Non recurring revenues | 3,500 | 1,931 | 1,468 | 2,106 | 1,794 | 1,783 | 1,772 | 1,760 | 1,792 | 1,785 |
| Activation fees | 1,940 | 834 | 391 | 494 | 162 | 124 | 84 | 43 | 44 | 4 |
| Equipment sales | 1,024 | 1,133 | 1,042 | 1,432 | 1,446 | 1,461 | 1,476 | 1,490 | 1,505 | 1,520 |
| Other revenues | 536 | 42 | 45 | 180 | 185 | 198 | 212 | 227 | 243 | 260 |
| Total revenues | 30,063 | 28,800 | 29,078 | 29,877 | 30,528 | 31,378 | 32,276 | 33,115 | 33,699 | 34,281 |

| BALANCE SHEET (CZK m) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004E | 2005E | 2006E | 2007E | 2008E | 2009E | 2010E |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Current Assets | 7,322 | 12,414 | 8,146 | 9,542 | 9,751 | 10,136 | 10,553 | 10,969 | 11,331 | 11,624 |
| Inventories | 1,443 | 888 | 505 | 694 | 701 | 708 | 715 | 722 | 729 | 737 |
| Receivables | 5,649 | 5,109 | 4,733 | 4,863 | 4,969 | 5,107 | 5,254 | 5,390 | 5,485 | 5,580 |
| Cash and equivalents | 230 | 6,417 | 2,908 | 3,985 | 4,081 | 4,320 | 4,585 | 4,856 | 5,116 | 5,307 |
| Fixed assets | 29,914 | 29,986 | 28,718 | 27,079 | 25,993 | 24,768 | 23,853 | 23,028 | 22,465 | 22,288 |
| Total Assets | 37,236 | 42,400 | 36,864 | 36,622 | 35,744 | 34,904 | 34,407 | 33,997 | 33,796 | 33,912 |
| Loans | 2,582 | 2,281 | 2,284 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 | 509 |
| Other liabilities | 11,541 | 10,425 | 9,120 | 9,553 | 9,593 | 9,989 | 10,431 | 11,051 | 11,643 | 12,058 |
| Shareholder's equity | 23,413 | 29,694 | 25,969 | 27,069 | 26,151 | 24,915 | 23,976 | 22,946 | 22,153 | 21,854 |
| Sh. Equity&Liabilities | 37,236 | 42,400 | 36,864 | 36,622 | 35,744 | 34,904 | 34,407 | 33,997 | 33,796 | 33,912 |

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